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The Albania-China Rift: For Tirana, Few Options

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

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The Albania-China Rift: For Tirana, Few Options

Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence

September 1977

Key Judgments

The rapid deterioration of Albania's relations with Peking this year for the first time raises the possibility of a break between the two formerly close allies. Available evidence is insufficient to permit a full explanation for the Albanian motivation in provoking such a rupture. There are indications, however, that Tirana is trying to devise a strategy to follow should it lose the political and material support provided by the Chinese for the past 16 years.

In view of Albania's strategic geographic location, its future course is of deep concern to all of its Mediterranean neighbors. The Soviet Union, which was allied with Tirana until 1961, might try to take advantage of a Sino-Albanian break to reestablish a political foothold in Albania, but Moscow would probably be rebuffed. Should the Soviets be successful, the status quo in the Balkans would be upset, and Albania's closest neighbors—Yugoslavia, Italy, and Greece—would perceive a serious threat to their security.

Driven by xenophobia and radical ideological fervor, the Albanian leadership has kept the country in relative isolation from the outside world. Economically backward, it has for the past 16 years been heavily dependent on Chinese help for its industrial development.

Tirana's apparent efforts to reorient its foreign policy have been accompanied by signs of ferment within the leadership. The massive purges of the cultural, military, and economic establishments since 1973 afford ample evidence of internal tensions. The Communist "old guard," led by aging party boss Enver Hoxha, is holding on to the reins of power, but younger functionaries who entered the power structure in the wake of the purges can be expected to make their mark on regime policies before long.

Despite our limited knowledge of developments inside Albania, some trends appear to be emerging.

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- Although Sino-Albanian relations have fallen to an unprecedented low, Tirana may still be able to avoid a final break with Peking.

- Should a break nevertheless occur, the regime would probably not shut itself off entirely from the rest of the world.

- Rather, Albania is likely to strive gradually to improve its relations with a number of countries, including industrialized Western states. There is evidence that the regime is already making probes in that direction.

There are obvious limitations to forming such new relationships.

- Since the break with Moscow, the Albanians have been obsessed with fear of a Soviet threat to their security. Hoxha, who engineered the split, and the rest of the Albanian leadership are likely to remain opposed to reestablishing better relations with Moscow.

- There is no evidence that Tirana is interested in a rapprochement with the US at this time. A policy change might emerge gradually, however.

- Ideological differences, combined with ethnic and territorial tensions, prevent Tirana from normalizing its relations with Yugoslavia—its most natural economic partner. Tito's success in improving relations with China has doubtless aroused Albanian suspicions of Chinese betrayal and political encirclement, making its opposition to Yugoslav "revisionism" even firmer.

- Despite Tirana's stepped-up efforts to improve relations with the West Europeans, the ideological rigidity of the Hoxha regime forecloses much progress. Under no foreseeable conditions would the West replace China as a "protector" against threats to Albania's security.

- Albania hopes it could compensate for the possible loss of Chinese aid by increasing trade with the West. The non-Communist world, however, is unlikely to provide enough assistance to enable Tirana to maintain its industrial development programs.

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Albania faces a slow and frustrating job in trying to work itself out of its exclusive foreign ties with the Chinese. Its alternatives to China's friendship and protection appear extremely limited.

Hoxha's departure and the formation of a new, younger leadership—when it happens—may open the door to important policy changes, but our knowledge of Albanian political and policy forces is too fragmentary even to guess at their direction.

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Albania and Surrounding Countries



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The Albania-China Rift: For Tirana, Few Options

The Sino-Albanian Alliance

Point of No Return?

In the late 1960s, cracks began to appear in the Sino-Albanian alliance. Until late last year, however, disagreements were more or less covered up by the regimes' public insistence on their "unbreakable friendship."

Mao Tse-tung's death last October deprived the Albanian Communists of their main benefactor. The Albanian leadership realized that the emergence of Hua Kuo-feng, a less doctrinaire politician, would lead to a more pragmatic political climate in China. The purge of the radical members of the Chinese leadership—the "Gang of Four"—whom Tirana considered as its ideological allies, further upset the Albanians. Tirana expressed its dissatisfaction in coolness toward Hua and unwillingness to endorse the Chinese campaign against the radicals.

Early this year Tirana began to use certain parties of the formerly pro-Peking Marxist-Leninist splinter movement as surrogates in its polemics against Peking. In response, the Chinese began to advise some other splinter parties of their differences with Albania in an attempt to prevent defections to Tirana.

Enver Hoxha and Chinese radical leader, Yao Wen-yuan, during the latter's visit to Albania in 1974.

By midsummer, relations between the two regimes had reached an unprecedented low. In recent months:

- The Albanian press launched fierce attacks on the basic tenets of China's foreign policies as formulated by Mao.
- Tirana recalled military personnel training with the Chinese Air Force and began a phased withdrawal of Albanian students studying in China.
- Rumors circulated that the Albanians had requested Peking to withdraw its technical experts from Albania. Despite denials on both sides, evidence is mixed. While some Chinese technicians are returning home, allegedly "for vacation," others are still arriving in Albania.
- Tirana continued to convert Marxist-Leninist splinter parties to its ideological line. At least one party quoted by the Albanian press has acknowledged Tirana as the sole leader of the Marxist-Leninist movement.
- The Albanians hinted that Chinese foreign policy principles might be as damaging to world revolution as Eurocommunism.

As of mid-September, however, neither country had engaged in public name-calling. There are some indications that the Albanian leadership may not be united in wanting to provoke a final breakdown of the partnership. An Albanian hint that the regime would be willing to hold talks with the Chinese could postpone a showdown. Peking has not as yet responded to this overture.

Origins of the Alliance

Khrushchev's theoretical innovations, as outlined at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956, met with adverse reaction in both Tirana and Peking. Both regimes were skeptical about the feasibility of the "parliamentary road" and viewed revolutionary violence as the only effective road to revolution. Both considered Khrushchev's policies of "peaceful coexistence" with the West opportunistic, and both continued to see the US as the main obstacle to achieving a worldwide victory for Communism. Additionally, fearing domestic repercussions, the Albanian leadership decided not to abandon the Stalinist legacy. Moreover, in the face of Moscow's rapprochement with Yugoslavia in the early 1960s, the Chinese and the Albanians shared an unrelenting hostility to Titoist "revisionism."

As their ideological quarrel with Khrushchev mounted, the Albanian leaders increasingly saw the Soviet Union as a threat. One result was the purge of elements thought to be close to Moscow; another was reliance on China to protect Albania against a potential Soviet threat.

For the Chinese, Albania's rejection of Moscow presented the first—and only—opportunity to rally a ruling Communist regime in support of their policies. Although the alliance with Tirana entailed some economic burden, Peking was convinced that the price was justified by the acquisition of an ally in a region that the Soviet Union traditionally regards as its sphere of influence.

The Source and Growth of the Dispute

Differences between Tirana and Peking, mainly over foreign policy issues, first appeared in the late 1960s. China's efforts to seek closer international ties with an increasingly large number of states, including NATO members, troubled the Albanians, who detected a neglect of revolutionary principles and a tendency toward opportunism.

The differences over practical approaches on foreign relations were soon reflected in the ideological formulations on which foreign policies of the two countries were based. Concerned over a Soviet military threat, Mao revised his views on the status of the two superpowers—the US and the Soviet Union. He concluded that despite the continuing war in Southeast Asia, the US presented a lesser danger to China's security than the Soviet Union.

The resulting rapprochement between Peking and Washington was condemned by the Albanian leadership, which held that it is not permissable to "lean on one imperialism to oppose the

ALBANIA: Estimated Foreign Trade



*Including imports financed by China

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other." Tirana continued to equate the danger posed by the two superpowers and claimed that "collusion" existed between Moscow and Washington at the expense of the Communist movement. The Chinese, on the other hand, maintained that fundamental conflicts between the US and the Soviet Union would undermine prospects for lasting cooperation.

During the 1960s and early 1970s, Albania was heavily dependent on Chinese economic assistance. Since 1961 this has totaled between $600 million and $900 million.[1] By 1975, however, signs of a reduction in Chinese economic and military assistance to Albania appeared. There is no clear evidence, however, that the decline--in the form of delays in the flow of materiel--was a conscious Chinese attempt to blackmail the Albanian leadership. But the latter probably viewed the decline as a confirmation of its suspicions about Peking's "opportunism."

Despite underlying ideological differences, on the surface Albanian-Chinese relations remained cordial until the death of Mao Tse-tung. One month after Mao's demise, Enver Hoxha, in a widely publicized report to the Albanian Party Congress, gave a comprehensive account of Tirana's opposition to Chinese foreign policy positions and Peking's attitudes toward the Marxist-Leninist splinter movement. The report did not

[1] In 1970, imports accounted for more than one-fifth of Albania's GNP. Albania must purchase abroad virtually all the machinery and equipment, structural steel, chemical fertilizer, and coke indispensible for industrial development. China has provided more than half of all imports, either directly or through purchases from West and East European countries. The Chinese have also made periodic wheat purchases abroad for Albania.

directly attack China, but reiterated Albania's opposition to China's rapprochement with the West and projected the Albanian positions as more revolutionary than Peking's. Conspicuously absent were references to Albania's moral and material debt to Peking and praise for the new Chinese leadership.

The extent of the decline in Albania's relations with Peking became publicly known only last July, when Albanian media published a bitter attack on the theory of the "three worlds," which has been the basis of China's foreign policy since the late 1960s. Tirana denounced the theory as anti-Marxist and charged that it undermined the revolutionary enthusiasm of the world proletariat. Since the theory had been formulated under the guidance of Mao Tse-tung, the attack was a clear break with Tirana's longstanding recognition of Mao as the paramount figure of contemporary Marxism-Leninism, the equal of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin.

A month after the first open attack, Albanian media began to hint at Chinese collusion with Eurocommunism. The Albanians charged that the theory of the "three worlds" was similar to Eurocommunist concepts in that it served to confuse the proletariat and divert it from the class struggle, thus contradicting the theory and practice of revolution and the teachings of Marxism-Leninism.

Split in the Marxist-Leninist Movement

Even before Mao's death, relations between Tirana and Peking had been impaired by conflicting evaluations of the importance of the Marxist-Leninist splinter parties. In the early 1960s, the existence of these parties was symbolic of Peking's success in splitting the previously cohesive pro-Soviet Communist movement. After the Cultural Revolution, the decline in China's ideological fervor and Chinese efforts to establish ties with West European governments lessened the importance of the Marxist-Leninist movement for Peking. Contacts with foreign Marxist-Leninists during this period were left mainly to members of the radical faction in the Chinese leadership.

In contrast, the Albanians continued to regard the splinter parties as important allies. By the mid-1970s, Tirana began to play an active role in providing organizational and ideological guidance to such groups, particularly those in Latin America and Western Europe. It sought, successfully, to become the spiritual center of the Marxist-Leninist movement, the position earlier occupied by Peking.

Tirana's involvement with the splinter parties has further intensified this year. The Albanians have used Marxist-Leninist groupings as surrogates in publicizing their opposition to China's foreign policies and were successful in splitting some of these parties. Some splinter parties recently acknowledged the Albanian party as the sole leader of Marxism-Leninism and rejected Chinese policies that were not in accord with Marxist-Leninist principles.

Early this year the Chinese leaders became increasingly aware of the challenge. The Chinese explained their policies to selected splinter parties and termed the Albanian line erroneous. Peking now appears to be actively cultivating those splinter parties still loyal to it and is countering Tirana's activity by setting up new groups with direct financial assistance from China.

Motivations

Why Albania decided to challenge Peking cannot be conclusively determined from available evidence. The Albanian actions appear less than prudent, in that their campaign could lead to a complete loss of Chinese economic assistance. While there appears to be no single, overriding motive, the following factors probably contributed to the decision.

- Albania's fierce sense of independence rejects submission to or interference by any foreign power, even a close ally such as China or, formerly, the USSR. The Albanians may have felt that China was trying to interfere in

their domestic affairs. Earlier this year Tirana came close to hinting at Chinese complicity with the "antiparty" elements who were purged in recent years.

- Albania may be acutely frustrated by the realization that its importance to China as an ally has been reduced. The improvement in recent years of China's relations with Yugoslavia—whose revisionism is an anathema to the Albanian regime—has no doubt exacerbated Tirana's frustration.

- The Albanians set great store in their pursuit of a "principled" foreign policy in the face of what the Albanians consider China's "opportunistic" approaches to the West and particularly the US.

- Albania is reacting to economic difficulties caused by the delays in Chinese assistance, which the Albanians associated with China's political opportunism.

- Ideological messianism prompts the regime to challenge China as the leader of the Marxist-Leninist splinter movement. They thus seek to replace the "adulterated" ideology of the Chinese leadership with Tirana's "correct" Marxist-Leninist line.

Explanations for the Chinese motivations for tolerating the Albanian challenge are equally tentative.

- Since the early 1970s, Albania has lost its importance for China as its sole ally and ideological supporter. The Chinese probably feel that the present relatively low cost of assisting Albania is compensated for by the political advantage of retaining their limited presence there which also provides a deterrent to Soviet reentry.

- Albanian criticism of China's foreign policies cannot distract from the overall advantages of China's pragmatic foreign policy line.

- In view of China's extensive contacts with other governments, Peking considers support from the basically weak and ineffectual Marxist-Leninist parties as less than essential. But since the Chinese also consider it necessary to portray the image of orthodoxy, Peking is embarrassed by the Albanian charges of political "opportunism." With its superior financial resources, China has been able, in some cases, to outmaneuver Albanian efforts to split the Marxist-Leninist splinter movement and is already setting up surrogate puppet parties to advocate its policies.

- Having feigned aloofness from the Albanian challenge, the Chinese have retained the option of striking back whenever it should appear convenient. Peking's initial response to Tirana is likely to be indirect, essentially a warning.

Internal Albanian Upheaval

Despite the appearance of political stability and totality of dictatorship, there is evidence of ferment within the Albanian leadership. In the past four years a large number of high- and middle-level officials, including Politburo members, were ousted on trumped-up charges. The purges, which were carried out in three phases, have decimated the cultural, military, and economic establishment.

The full meaning of these purges is obscure, but they seemed to have involved the existence of high-level dissatisfaction with Hoxha's policies and concern over Albania's economic difficulties which have been aggravated by the decline in Chinese assistance. Recently there have been indications that Tirana may be considering further purges. This time the victims could be openly identified as elements supporting the divisive line.

The party leadership is aging. Moreover, Hoxha's health and authority appear to have declined in recent months. The leadership may be under pressure from younger persons—still unknown quantities to the West—who entered the highest party echelons in the wake of the purges. While a substantial impact on policy may not come soon, this new generation of leaders is already making its mark on the political scene.

Leading Functionaries Purged During the 1973-76 Period

Date of Purge	Name	Party Rank	Position
Mid-1973	Todi LUBONJA	CC	Director General, State Radio and TV
Mid-1973	Fadil PACRAMI	CC	Chairman, People's Assembly
July 1973	Rudi MONARI	ACC	First Secretary, Union of Albanian Working Youth
Mid-1973	Agim MERO	CC	Rector, Tirana State University
July 1973	Dhimiter SHUTERIQI	—	Chairman, Union of Writers and Artists
July 1973	Vilson KILICA	—	Secretary General, Union of Writers and Artists
Mid-1974	Beqir BALLUKU	PB	Deputy Premier; Minister of Defense
1974?	Petrit DUME	APB	First Deputy Minister of Defense; Chief of Staff
October 1974	Hito CAKO	CC	Deputy Minister of Defense
Mid-1974	Rahman PARLLAKU	CC	Deputy Minister of Defense
Mid-1974	Arif HASKO	—	Deputy Minister of Defense
October 1974	Aleks VERLI	—	Minister of Finance
October 1974	Milo QIRKO*	CC	Minister of Communications
Mid-1975	Abdyl KELLEZI	PB	Chairman, State Planning Commission
June 1975	Koco THEODHOSI	PB	Minister of Industry and Mines
August 1975	Kico NGJELA	CC	Minister of Trade
Mid-1975	Vasil KATI	—	Deputy Minister of Trade
June 1975	Gogo KOZMA	—	Deputy Minister of Trade
April 1975	Hasan DUMA	—	Deputy Minister of Education and Culture
June 1975	Kico NEGOVANI	—	Deputy Minister of Education and Culture
April 1976	Piro DODBIBA	APB	Minister of Agriculture
April 1976	Thoma DELJANA	CC	Minister of Education and Culture
November 1976	Lefter GOGA*	ACC	Minister of Finance

*Although removed from official position retained party post.
Abbreviations: PB—Politburo; CC—Central Committee; A—Alternate.

Phase One: Cultural Purge

Despite its consistent efforts, the Albanian leadership has not been able to seal off the country completely from foreign influences. The few instances of relaxation of barriers to outside contacts only prompted an influx of more liberal trends and the regime quickly drew back. The most recent such "opening," which occurred in the early 1970s, involved: a party campaign to eliminate backward social concepts that in the end encouraged tendencies favoring change and liberalism; the climate of detente and accompanying relaxation between the US and the Communist nations; China's decreasing hostility toward the West and particularly its opening to the US in 1972; and the introduction of television in Albania. This latter development—particularly the Yugoslav and Greek transmissions—allowed some Albanians to circumvent official censorship and acquaint themselves with foreign cultural trends.

The party's ability to quickly close this opening and restore cultural and ideological orthodoxy, however, proved that the totalitarian nature of the regime had not been significantly weakened by the temporary impact of outside influences. The first phase of the purges, in 1973, targeted on those held responsible for

"incorrect" cultural policies. Leading functionaries in the Tirana party organization, the state radio and television network, and the youth organization, were ousted. The entire leadership of the Albanian Writers and Artists Union was also replaced. Rigid cultural and ideological orthodoxy has been maintained ever since.

Phase Two: Military Purge

In 1974 the regime thoroughly purged the military establishment. Since Albania's break with the Soviet Union, its defense capability had been dependent on Chinese supplies of military equipment. Fluctuations in the flow of military assistance in the early 1970s—including no deliveries at all in 1973—probably caused uneasiness within the Albanian military establishment about their ability to resist aggression. The Soviet Union's success early in 1974 in securing limited naval repair facilities in Yugoslavia—at Tivat, some 80 kilometers north of the Albanian border—probably reinforced doubts within the defense establishment about the adequacy of Albania's defense structure.

The real reason behind the purge of Defense Minister Balluku and his close associates in 1974 is unclear. Charges against them, including treason and collaboration with Moscow, are not convincing. Balluku's close ties with the Chinese military leadership make it unlikely that he had sought to replace Chinese assistance with Soviet weapons. It is possible, however, that Balluku and other military leaders had recommended the broadening of economic and political ties with the West along the lines then being followed by Peking. Such a proposal, coming from the military, could have been interpreted by party chief Hoxha as an attempt to undermine the party's control over the military.

Phase Three: Economic Purge

The third and most extensive phase of the purges hit the economic establishment. It appears to have been directly related to the difficulties experienced by the economy during the fifth Five Year Plan (FYP) period (1971-75).

Despite large Chinese contributions in the form of complete plants and equipment, during the fifth FYP the country's economic growth declined. The real extent of the decline is not known to us, but the main indexes of economic development for the fifth FYP period show generally lower percentages than those for the previous FYP period (1966-70). (See table). The delays in Chinese deliveries probably contributed to the drop in economic growth.[2]

[2] Among the largest projects the Chinese contracted are the iron and steel complex in Elbasan, two oil refineries, a chrome ore processing plant, a nitrogen fertilizer plant, a superphosphate plant, and a number of hydroelectric plants. Last June, the Albanians publicly blamed delays in the construction of the Elbasan complex and the oil refinery in Ballsh on the failure of "outside" sources to deliver machinery and materials.

Indicators of Albanian Economic Development, 1966-80
(Percentage Increases)

	1966-70		1971-75		1976-80
	Plan	Claimed Results	Plan	Claimed Results	Plan
Gross social product	58-63	61	NA	37	NA
Gross industrial production	50-54	83	60-65	52	41-44
Gross agricultural production	41-46	28	50-55	33	38-41
National income	45-50	55	55-60	38	38-40
Per capita real income	15-17	17	14-17	14	11-14
State Investments	34	55	70-75	50	35-38
Transport of goods	41-46	53	65-70	45	30-32
Retail sale turnover	25-27	45	36-39	35	22

Source: Albanian official data.

The full impact of the reduced assistance probably became clear to Tirana's economic planners toward the end of the plan period. It may have prompted some members of the leadership to advocate countermeasures, such as lessening Albania's economic isolation from the rest of Europe. Possibly alarmed by the political repercussions of those initiatives, the Hoxha administration launched a widespread purge of the Albanian economic establishment in 1975.

Hoxha and the Party Leadership

The purges had initially seemed to strengthen the hands of the Party's "old guard" that was loosely associated with First Secretary Enver Hoxha. Now in his 69th year, Hoxha has been the acknowledged head of the party since it was founded in 1941. His control of the state and party apparatus was secured by subsequent purges of political opponents of all hues. The hardcore element of the leadership still forms the majority of the 12-member Politburo.

There are indications, however, that in recent months Hoxha has encountered some opposition within the leadership and his position may have weakened. Debate within the highest echelons of the party over economic priorities and consequent alternate courses is apparently continuing. The new Albanian constitution, published in December 1976, revealed differences over the relative value of Chinese assistance and of self-reliance. One faction had apparently managed to incorporate its views on the importance of self-reliance as *the* primary force in socialist construction without a corresponding reference to Chinese assistance. Hoxha, for his part, continued to cite the importance of "selfless" Chinese aid, implying his disagreement with those advocating sole reliance on the country's meager resources.

Hoxha's economic views—which show him as more of a realist than some of his colleagues—stand in sharp contradiction to his image as the challenger to the Chinese over the issue of ideological orthodoxy. In any case, the divided economic views raise the question whether the party leader, known to be in failing health, retains full control over the regime.

Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu in 1976 photo.

The "old guard," although still active, has become just that—old. Premier Mehmet Shehu, who has been generally considered Hoxha's chosen successor, is 64. His power was bolstered when he assumed the post of Defense Minister in 1974. Shehu, however, also has medical problems that would appear to disqualify him from replacing Hoxha.

We have little information on the younger functionaries who now occupy leading positions in the state and government apparatus. The Politburo has two new younger persons and there are quite a few on the Central Committee.[3] They were probably handpicked by Hoxha on the basis of their performance and personal loyalty. While their backgrounds are obscure, one common denominator seems to be a shared experience in the provincial party apparatus.

[3] The two additions to the Politburo, Hekuran Isai and Pali Miska, are both believed to be in their 40s. Former provincial party functionaries, they entered the government in the wake of the purges and rose rapidly. In addition, four new functionaries have entered the Politburo as alternates since 1975. On the new Central Committee, elected at the November 1976 Congress, 43 of the 77 members are newcomers; 18 of the 38 alternates are also new.

Despite the introduction of new people into the highest levels of the party and government, there has been no visible progress in solving the country's economic problems. Moreover, the escalating differences with China could have a destabilizing effect on officialdom. Having started their political careers in an era characterized by Albania's strong reliance on China, some of the younger leaders may be concerned about the consequences of provoking the Chinese. Unlike the "old guard," these leaders may also be less willing to make economic sacrifices for the sake of ideological orthodoxy.

As long as Hoxha formally heads the party, Albania's political course is likely to reflect the ideological radicalism that has characterized it for two decades. We cannot exclude the possibility, however, that once he departs, more pragmatic policies will be pursued.

Foreign Policy Options

With their relations with Peking deteriorating, the Albanians have been forced to consider their future foreign policy options. These are limited. The leadership's obsession with a Soviet threat to its security and its fierce anti-Americanism constrain its turning to either superpower for political or economic support. Neighboring Yugoslavia, which would be a natural economic partner, is ideologically unacceptable to the Albanians, and the Yugoslavs are wary of the Albanian minority and influence in their poorest border province of Kosovo. Recent efforts to improve relations with certain West European countries suggest that Tirana is seeking political support against the Soviets. The regime's dogmatic opposition to democratic systems, however, is likely to prevent the development of closer political relations. Albania's inability to substantially increase its exports to industrialized countries or to accept Western credits is bound to prevent it from replacing the role China played as an economic partner.

Fear of Soviet Intervention

Since the break with Khrushchev, the Albanians have consistently viewed the Soviet Union as a threat to their security. Despite recurring purges—which probably eliminated all elements sympathetic to Moscow—Tirana still insists the Soviets want to reestablish hegemony in Albania. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which demonstrated Moscow's willingness to intervene militarily in East Europe, came as a further shock to the Albanian leadership. Tirana renounced Warsaw Pact membership[4] and probably also ordered a thorough reevaluation of Albania's strategic planning. In addition to seeking more military aid from the Chinese, the Albanians made some attempt to reduce their isolation from Balkan neighbors, including Yugoslavia, and explored contacts in Western Europe.

Having personally engineered Albania's break with Moscow and the Albanian alliance with China, Hoxha has been fearful that the Soviets might attempt to overthrow him. The regime's longstanding anti-Soviet propaganda campaign is aimed at instilling a permanent hatred of Soviet "social imperialism." Although there is no evidence of any substantial Soviet attempt to undermine Hoxha, internal opponents have almost invariably been accused of being pro-Moscow or, in the case of former Defense Minister Balluku, of joining the Soviets in a conspiracy against the regime.

Although it has diplomatic relations with all the East European states, Albania has since 1961 steadfastly refused to reestablish contacts with the Soviet Union.[5] It has also invariably rejected frequent offers by the Brezhnev leadership to improve relations. A recent Romanian attempt to mediate—possibly encouraged by the Soviets—was also turned down by the Albanians.

[4] This was a symbolic gesture as Albania had not participated in the Pact since the late 1950s.

[5] Tirana's relations with Moscow's East European allies, although correct, remain low key throughout this period. Romania's strained relationship with the Soviet Union and friendship with Peking helped create better relations between Tirana and Bucharest, including exchanges of delegations and occasional party contacts. There is evidence that in recent years Moscow tried—unsuccessfully—to use the Romanians as mediators in its dispute with Albania. Albania has maintained a modest level of trade exchanges with Warsaw Pact countries but none with the Soviet Union. Although its exports to East European countries rose by 55 percent between 1971 and 1975, they grew much more slowly in real terms.

Tirana uses its defiance of Moscow's "revisionistic" foreign policies to demonstrate the correctness of its own ideological stance. Ironically, in their polemics with Peking the Albanians have hinted that the Chinese have been following policies similar to those of the Soviets in the 1960s.

We do not expect Albania to begin a rapprochement with Moscow as long as Hoxha remains in power. After his departure there may be an easing in hostility toward the Soviets, but Hoxha's heirs will still probably view Moscow as a lasting threat to Albania's independence.

Yugoslavia

Hoxha bears a personal antipathy toward Tito that originated in the Yugoslav leader's support for one of Hoxha's rivals during the immediate postwar period when Yugoslav influence with the new Albanian Communist Party was paramount. Belgrade's plans to annex Albania were thwarted only because of the Soviet-Yugoslav split of 1948, and Albanian paranoia about possible renewed Yugoslav intervention has persisted. The large Albanian minority in Yugoslavia's bordering Kosovo Province and Tirana's periodic interventions on its behalf also trouble Albanian-Yugoslav relations—the more so because Kosovo's poverty and political restiveness make the region a drain on and a vulnerability in the Yugoslav federation.

The antipathy is also ideological. Ever since the 1948 Cominform resolution excommunicated Yugoslavia from the Communist camp, Albania's opposition to Yugoslav "revisionism" has not wavered. The Khrushchev rapprochement in the mid-1950s and subsequent periods of improvement in Soviet-Yugoslav relations aroused suspicions of encirclement. The commitment against "revisionism" mitigated against a full normalization of relations with Belgrade despite Albania's and Yugoslavia's mutual condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The Albanian leadership's opposition to Yugoslav "revisionism" can also be explained partly in terms of Tirana's relations with the Marxist-Leninist splinter parties. In challenging Peking as the sponsor of the Marxist-Leninist movement, Tirana presents itself as the sole remaining defender of "correct" Communist dogma. As long as Hoxha remains in power, ideological considerations alone will probably block normalization of Yugoslav-Albanian relations.

The Albanians probably believe that Tito's current visit to China will formalize Sino-Yugoslav rapprochement, and Tirana will no doubt increase its anti-Peking polemics as well as nourish this additional reason to mistrust Belgrade.

Albania's unrelenting hostility to the Yugoslavian form of Communism is ironic since nonaligned Yugoslavia has long provided a buffer between Albania and the Warsaw Pact nations. In addition, Belgrade's ideological differences with Moscow have curtailed the emergence of pro-Soviet forces in Yugoslavia that could present a threat to Albania.

Even though the Albanians revile Tito, Tirana must be disturbed by the thought of his eventual demise. Tirana would view any increase in Soviet influence in Yugoslavia during the post-Tito era as endangering Albania's security. Moreover, possible Yugoslav apprehension over heightened Albanian irredentism in Kosovo Province after Tito's departure—a likely accompaniment of any post-Tito strains in Yugoslav federalism—could pose a serious problem for Tirana.

The ideological rigidity of the Albanian party has also inhibited economic contacts between the two countries. Although bilateral trade showed a sixfold increase between 1970 and 1975, it has not reached its full potential. For example, a planned railroad line, connecting the Yugoslav rail system with the main Albanian line, was not completed because of the uncertain political climate. There have been no new Albanian initiatives toward Belgrade in recent months, but the possibility of losing Chinese assistance could prompt the regime to try to increase its economic ties with Yugoslavia.

Western Europe

Albania now has diplomatic relations with all West European nations except Spain, West Germany, and the UK and is currently trying to strengthen its existing contacts. In doing so, Tirana is cultivating ties not only with nonaligned governments, but also with NATO members the Albanians perceive as independent of the US.[6]

The Albanians hope they will be able to establish closer economic ties to compensate for the reduction or possible loss of economic assistance from Peking. Their meager economic resources, however, permit only a modest expansion of exports to the industrialized states. Despite a fivefold increase between 1970 and 1975, Albania's exports to the OECD countries amounted to no more than $50 million in 1975.

Moreover, as long as ideological extremism determines policy, Albania cannot conclude credit arrangements with the West. The constitution forbids borrowing from "capitalist" countries and prohibits forming joint enterprises with foreign concerns.

These restrictions seriously hinder the importation of foreign equipment necessary to maintain the industrialization program. By sharply reducing machinery imports, Albania could probably purchase the most essential industrial and agricultural materials. In the long run, however, this would inevitably have a negative impact on economic development. Albanian planners are probably also aware that the West will not find it expedient to replace Chinese economic aid and technical advisers.

There is also some evidence that Albanian overtures to Western Europe involve political considerations. [redacted] 25X1

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In view of the regime's ideological incompatibility with democratic political systems, it is not clear what sort of political arrangement Tirana may hope to establish with West European governments. The Albanians probably feel that the Mediterranean countries will want to take out some insurance against the possibility of increased Soviet influence in Albania. [redacted] 25X1

Relations with the US

The Hoxha regime's attitude toward the United States has been unrelentingly hostile. Hoxha and other Albanian leaders depicit Washington as the world's leading reactionary power and a direct threat to Albania's security. This rhetoric includes elements of genuine uncompromising hostility to the US, as well as considerable ideological posturing. 25X1

Tirana went out of its way to rebuff US overtures in the early 1970s. We have seen no hint of any change in this attitude. It would no doubt be awkward for the Albanians to make an overture to the US while criticizing the Chinese for doing the same thing. A US connection, however, or the hint that one was in the making, might serve Tirana's interest in fending off any perceived threat from Yugoslavia and the USSR.

Although the Albanians are unlikely to pursue relations with Washington as long as Hoxha is in power, they could indirectly signal a moderation of their anti-US stand by de-escalating criticism of Chinese-US contacts. Albania might be willing to purchase US-licensed equipment from West European countries, pretending not to notice the American connection. Tirana may also gradually modify the extremely hostile tone of its anti-US propaganda, without essentially changing its ideological opposition to the US.

[6] Italy, with which the Albanian Communists have maintained a special relationship since the 1950s, is an obvious exception. That relationship stems from historical contacts and geographical proximity, and it has not been influenced by Italy's close political ties with the US.

COUNTRY BRIEF

ALBANIA

LAND
28,749 sq. km; 20% arable, 23% other agriculture, 43% forest, 14% other

WATER
Coastline: 418 km
Limits of territorial waters: 15 nm (claimed)

PEOPLE
Population: 2,297,000 (1973)
Ethnic divisions: 96% Albanians; 4% Greeks, Vlachs, Gypsies, Bulgarians, Serbs
Religion: 70% Muslim, 20% Albanian Orthodox, 10% Roman Catholic
Languages: Albanian, Greek
Literacy: Estimated 70% to 75%
Labor force: 911,000 (mid-1969); about 60% engaged in agriculture

GOVERNMENT
Type: Communist; ruled by Albanian Workers Party
Political subdivisions: 27 *rreth* (district), including city of Tirana
Government leaders: Chief of State (a ceremonial position) and President of Presidium of People's Assembly, Haxhi Leshi; Premier and Chairman of Council of Ministers, Mehmet Shehu
Elections: National elections every 4 years; last elections October 1974

POLITICAL SYSTEM
The Albanian Workers Party is the only legal party. First Secretary, Enver Hoxha
Party membership: 101,500 (November 1976)
Member of the United Nations. Has not participated in CEMA since rift with USSR in 1961; formally withdrew from Warsaw Pact in 1968

ECONOMY
GNP: Estimated $748 million in 1970 (1970 prices), or $350 per capita
Agriculture: Food deficit area; main crops are corn, wheat, tobacco, sugar beets, cotton
Major resources: Crude oil, brown coal, chromium, iron-nickel, copper, construction materials
Main industries: Agricultural processing, textiles, clothing, lumber, extractive industries
Electric power: 500,000 kWh capacity (1976); 1.7 billion kWh produced, 710 kWh per capita
Exports: Tobacco, cigarettes, chromium, iron-nickel, low quality crude oil, asphalt
Imports: Machinery and equipment, coking coal, rolled steel, chemical fertilizers, wheat
Aid: China extended an estimated $900 million in 1961-75

COMMUNICATIONS
Railroads: 272 km standard gauge (1975)
Highways: 4,990 km
Inland waterways: 43 km plus Albanian sections of Lakes Scutari, Ohrid, and Prespa
Pipeline: Estimated 117 km crude, 64 km gas
Ports: 2 major (Durres, Vlore), 2 minor
Merchant marine: 11 ships (1,000 g.r.t. and over) totaling 53,806 g.r.t. and 72,753 d.w.t.
Civil air: No major transport aircraft
Airfields: 11 total; 5 have permanent-surface runways; 5 have runways, 2,500-3,499 m, 6 have runways 1,000-2,499 m
Telecommunications: Serves basic needs of government; limited service to public; limited coverage by radio and wired broadcasts; 1 TV station (Tirana); estimated 13,000 telephones, 173,000 radio receivers, 2,100 TV receivers

DEFENSE
Personnel: Armed forces: ground 25,000, naval 3,500, air and air defense 12,650, militarized security 12,200
Ground forces units: 4 infantry brigades, 1 tank brigade, 2 coastal defense bases, 6 regiments (4 artillery, 1 engineer, 1 signal)
Ships: 4 submarines (3 operational), 4 submarine chasers, 8 minesweepers, over 60 coastal patrol types, 6 river/roadstead patrol types, 3 auxiliaries, 20 service craft
Aircraft: 139 in operational units (103 jet fighters, 4 transports, 32 helicopters)
Missiles: 4 SA-2 battalions (24 launchers)
Supply: Since 1961 Albania has relied on China for all military materiel with the exception of some small arms and ammunitions manufactured domestically

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The Pakistan National Alliance
Participants and Prospects

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RP 77-10220
August 1977

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

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The Pakistan National Alliance
Participants and Prospects

Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence

August 1977

The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) appears to have the edge on its opponents in the race for the national and provincial assembly elections scheduled for 18 October. The nine-party alliance, formed on 11 January, has so far maintained a high degree of unity, despite the deep differences among its members. It has done so by concentrating on the one point on which its members are in complete agreement—the need to defeat former Prime Minister Bhutto and his Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Once in power, this coalition of Islamic conservatives, secular nationalists, and provincial autonomists will face issues which could quickly bring basic disagreements to the surface and threaten to split the Alliance.

The Religious Parties

Pakistan is 97 percent Muslim, and religion plays an important part in the lives of most Pakistanis, but the religious parties have had little success in their attempts to win public office. Pakistani voters tend to doubt the ability of the religious leaders to govern, and even many of those who favor making Pakistan a more Islamic country believe the programs of the religious parties are too extreme.

Success for the Islamic parties has also been hindered by disagreements among their leaders which have historically prevented the formation of an Islamic front. Furthermore, all of the major religious parties are oriented toward Sunni Islam, which limits their appeal to the quarter of the population that is Shiah, the other main branch of Islam.

Jamaat-i-Islami (JI). The Congregation of Islam, founded in 1941 by Maulana Syed Abdul Ala Maudoodi, is probably Pakistan's best organized and most cohesive party. Maudoodi, because of his advanced age, has relinquished the leadership of the party to others but still has considerable influence. Tofail Mohammed is the current chairman, but another member, Professor Ghafoor Ahmed, the secretary general of the PNA, has been far more prominent in recent months.

The party seeks to reorganize Pakistani society in accordance with a strict interpretation of Islamic law and custom. It tends toward a pan-Islamic rather than nationalistic point of view which, in the 1940s, lay behind its failure to support efforts to create Pakistan, something its more nationalist opponents frequently point out.

Although the party is well disciplined, it has limited popular support and has not done well in elections. It is strongest in the Punjab and has developed some following among non-Sindhis in the Sind, but it is very weak in Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier.

Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI). The Society of the Ulema (religious leaders) of Islam has its greatest strength in the North-West Frontier Province, where its leader, Mufti Mahmood, who is also president of the PNA, headed a coalition government in 1972-73.

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

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Like the JI, the JUI seeks to transform Pakistan into a truly Islamic state. Both parties favor free enterprise, but the JUI is more sympathetic toward socialism. It is, however, more conservative than the JI on issues such as motion pictures and the role of women in society.

Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP). The Society of the Ulema of Pakistan, led by Shah Ahmed Noorani, was formed by dissidents from the JUI in 1969. It draws on a much more mystic interpretation of Islam than the other two major Islamic parties. Much of its political strength derives from the support of local pirs (saints), the belief in whom the JI maintains is heresy.

Although also seeking to establish an Islamic state, the JUP is far more nationalistic than the JI or JUI. It is strongest in the Punjab, where it elected four delegates to the National Assembly in 1970. All later defected to Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party, but, with Bhutto in trouble, the party might well regain those seats.

Kaksar Tehriq. The Kaksar Movement, headed by Hadji Safaraz Khan, was founded in 1930 as a paramilitary organization dedicated to Islamic dominance in the subcontinent. Although some of its members and sympathizers have held public office, it is not strictly a political party and played little part in either the last election campaign or in the agitation and negotiations which followed. Presumably it would have, at most, a very minor role in any Alliance government.

The Nationalists

The secular nationalist parties in the Alliance (as well as Bhutto's PPP) reflect the basic outlook of most Pakistanis, at least the 80 percent of the population that lives in the Sind and the Punjab. From the time Pakistan attained independence 30 years ago, the nation's rulers—whether soldiers or civilians—have placed national interests ahead of those of the provinces and pragmatism ahead of doctrine in their economic and social policies. They have based their foreign policies on the threat from India and have supported Islam—although usually more because they see it as a force for national unity than because of any deep personal belief.

The voters have supported men with such an outlook in the past and are likely to continue to do so. Policy differences among the secular nationalists are at times important to the voters, but they are more likely to base their choice on their assessment of the candidates' character, personality, and prestige.

Pakistan Muslim League. The Pakistan Muslim League—the party responsible for the creation of Pakistan—has fallen on hard times after dominating the country's politics for most of its first quarter century. When it ruled, its programs were highly nationalistic, mildly socialistic, and basically secular.

Its strength was based on the support of local political leaders, many of them more interested in the benefits of association with the ruling party than in its ideology. Corruption and an inability to solve Pakistan's economic problems eroded its popular support, and defections and divisions had reduced it to little more than a platform for a few aging politicians at the time of the formation of the PNA.

The present Muslim League faction in the PNA is led by the Pir of Pagaro and has retained some potential as a rallying point. (Another faction, under Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan remains outside the PNA.) There have already been defections from Bhutto's PPP, which is composed largely of former Muslim Leaguers, but most have yet formally to join another party. Although membership in the more powerful Tehriq-i-Istiqlal might be more profitable in the long run for the PPP defectors, they are likely to find a warmer welcome and be more comfortable in one of the factions of the much less moralistic Muslim League.

Tehriq-i-Istiqlal. The Solidarity Movement, founded in 1970 and still dominated by former Air Force commander Asghar Khan, is probably the single most important party in the Alliance. During the last election campaign, Asghar emerged as the leading spokesman for the

opposition. Later, during the negotiations with Prime Minister Bhutto on holding a new election, he was able to convince his more moderate colleagues in the Alliance to go along with his refusal to compromise. The Tehriq will probably receive a significant share of the places on the PNA slate, and many Pakistanis see Asghar as the country's probable next prime minister.

Asghar's devotion to principle and his incorruptibility are both his greatest political asset and his greatest liability. In a country where most politicians are regarded—usually correctly—as motivated primarily by self-interest and a willingness to do almost anything for a price, Asghar stands out as a man who can be trusted to do what he believes is right.

Air Marshal Asghar Khan
Tehriq-i-Istiqlal leader

On the other hand, he has great difficulty making the deals that are the life blood of Pakistani politics, and at various times—such as when he once quit politics in disgust—he has appeared both erratic and ineffective.

Asghar is a strong nationalist and an advocate of major improvements in Pakistan's defense capabilities. He favors moderately socialistic economic policies, although his land reform program would go far beyond what the Bhutto government attempted and could alienate many local political leaders, most of whom are landowners.

Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP). The Pakistan Democratic Party was formed by several small parties, including the Pakistan Democratic Movement (itself a coalition including Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan's splinter of the once powerful Awami League and a small religious party), and the Justice Party, founded and later abandoned by Asghar Khan.

Much of the PDP's strength was in East Pakistan, and following the division of the country in 1971, there were major defections from the West Pakistani remnant because of disagreement over Pakistani policies toward Bangladesh.

The PDP would win few if any seats running on its own—in 1970, the only National Assembly seat it won was in East Pakistan—but Nasrullah Khan, the party leader and vice president of the PNA, probably has more influence in the Alliance than his party's popular support warrants.

The party takes a fairly moderate stance on most issues—regional autonomy in the context of national unity, land reform which would hurt only the large landowners, nationalization of some—but hardly all—industries, and turning Pakistan more toward Islam, but not to the extent advocated by the major religious parties.

All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. The All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference is technically not Pakistani, but a major party in Azad Kashmir, that part of Kashmir

under Pakistani control but theoretically independent. The party, headed by former Azad Kashmir president Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, favors the union of all Kashmir with Pakistan following a plebiscite throughout the state. When it was in power, it generally followed the policies laid down for it by Islamabad.

The Conference was the ruling party in Azad Kashmir in 1975, when Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto engineered Qayyum's removal from the presidency. Soon afterward, in an election which the Conference boycotted, the pro-Bhutto Azad Kashmir People's Party gained control of the legislature. The Conference expects to regain control of the state in an election scheduled to be held in October.

The Provincial Autonomists

Punjabis have generally dominated Pakistani politics, even though no Punjabi has actually headed a government since the late 1950s. Although there has been some resentment of Punjabi dominance in the Sind, the viewpoints of the people in the two provinces are close enough so that no major problems have arisen.

Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province, however, have a long tradition of resistance to control by the central government—the Punjabis and their Sindhi allies—and their efforts to seek greater provincial autonomy have been a greater or lesser problem for all Pakistani governments.

National Democratic Party (NDP). The National Democratic Party was founded in 1975, a few months after Bhutto banned the National Awami Party (NAP) and arrested many of its leaders including Khan Abdul Wali Khan, at that time the most prominent of the opposition leaders. Bhutto charged the party with plotting the secession, with Afghan backing, of Baluchistan and the NWFP.

Although Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari, the present NDP leader, was not a member of the NAP, most other party leaders were, and Wali Khan's wife plays a more prominent role in party affairs than Mazari. The NAP and NDP, in fact, are virtually identical.

Wali Khan
Imprisoned leader of the NAP

The NAP historically has been three parties, each having little in common with the others. In the Sind and the Punjab, it was a small, almost insignificant collection of extreme leftists, despite Wali's efforts to build a national following.

In the North-West Frontier, it was the party of the Pathans and the most important party in the province. It favored much greater provincial autonomy, and some of its members may have hoped eventually to unite the province with Afghanistan. Although extreme leftists were a small minority in the Frontier NAP, at least one prominent party member was a Communist.

In Baluchistan, the NAP was the vehicle of the generally conservative leaders of the major Baluchi's tribes. Their main objective was the protection of their traditional powers from both the provincial government—which they controlled until Bhutto intervened in 1973—and

from the central government. The party was, in fact, so thoroughly Baluch that the Pathans in the northern part of the province formed a splinter NAP of their own.

The Allies of the Alliance

Two other parties have announced that they will support the Alliance, although no formal arrangements have been worked out and might well be difficult.

All Pakistan Muslim League (QML). The Muslim League faction headed by Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan (not to be confused with the leader of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference) had some strength in the Sind and Punjab, but its major support was in those areas of the North-West Frontier where Pakistani nationalism was a greater force than Pathan separatism. Qayyum has been a rival of the provincial autonomists since his successful efforts to include the Frontier Province in Pakistan despite the strong opposition of Wali Khan's father and uncle.

The Qayyum Muslim League's programs are almost indentical to those of the Muslim League headed by the Pir of Pagaro, but there is little love lost between the two groups. Qayyum broke with the other party in the 1960s, and his later service as interior minister in Bhutto's cabinet further worsened his relations with Alliance leaders. The delegate to the National Assembly elected by the QML in 1977, has announced that the party has merged with the Pir's Muslim League, but other party officials have denied this.

Jiye Sind Mazar. It is unlikely that the Alliance either sought or wants the support of G. M. Syed's Sindhi nationalists now united under the name of the Long Live Sind Front. A rabid defender of the Sind, and one whose pronouncements raise some questions about his sanity, Syed is likely to be more of a liability than an asset. He might be able to win some votes from the Sindhis who have supported Bhutto in the last two elections, but only through vitriolic attacks on the non-Sindhi groups in the province who have previously been the Alliance's most dependable supporters.

An Alliance Government

Should the Pakistan National Alliance win the election in October, the government that would be formed would almost certainly be dominated by the nationalists. Although the nationalists would control the government in Islamabad, and presumably the provincial governments in the Sind and the Punjab as well, provincial autonomists would almost certainly gain control in Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier.

Even with goodwill on both sides, some tension in relations between the latter two provincial governments and the federal government seems inevitable. The leaders of the NDP, moreover, have often distrusted Asghar and the Muslim Leaguers, and the failure of these Alliance spokesmen to make a serious effort for the release of Wali Khan has probably increased this hostility. Most of the politicians jailed by Bhutto were released either during the negotiations which preceded the military coup or soon afterward by the martial law administration, but Wali's treason trial drags on.

Many of the nationalists would see the NDP's efforts for greater provincial autonomy as a prelude to secession, and the government might well find itself under pressure from the military to exert stronger control over provincial affairs. An open confrontation between the bulk of the Alliance and the NDP would be difficult to avoid, and if the Alliance's victory margin in October is slim, an open break could leave Pakistan with a minority government.

Other threats to Alliance unity will be more manageable. The religious parties are certain to press for reforms to make Pakistan into the Islamic state they have long desired, and the nationalists will probably be willing to make the cosmetic changes requested. If the religious parties demand more basic changes—such as the abolition of the banking system (which violates

Islamic law by paying and charging interest)—there would be a confrontation in which at least some of the religious leaders almost certainly would leave the Alliance.

Asghar Khan seems likely to dominate the nationalists, and through them the government, even if someone else becomes prime minister. He may, however, have difficulty controlling his fellow nationalists, including those in his own party. Few of them have the strength of character of Asghar and will find it hard to resist the temptations of office. Eventually a major confrontation could develop either because of an attempt to ease the too honest Asghar from power or because of an attempt by Asghar to cleanse the government.

Foreign policy is unlikely to be a major cause of disagreement in an Alliance government. Fear of India and the need for foreign aid will continue to determine the direction of foreign relations. The religious parties, despite some misgivings about dealing with atheists, will probably not object to continued good relations with Peking because of the importance of Chinese political and military support. All parties—although not necessarily for the same reasons—will support efforts to strengthen ties with other Islamic countries. An Alliance government may well be more disposed than Bhutto's to maintaining good relations with the US, although it will be reluctant to be seen as bowing to foreign pressure on issues such as the acquisition of a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant from France. Only relations with Afghanistan could cause major disagreement within the Alliance, but trouble with Kabul—which has supported the provincial autonomists in the past—is more likely to be the result than the cause of a falling out between the nationalists and the NDP.

A few of the major Alliance leaders are noted for their political skill. Asghar has great difficulty in compromising, the religious leaders are prone to bitter disputes with each other as well as with other party leaders, and Wali Khan and the other provincial autonomists have used confrontation as a major political weapon in the past. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, probably a more skillful politician than anyone in the Alliance, will do his utmost to encourage their differences.

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